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Abstract—We study private information retrieval (PIR) on
coded data with possibly colluding servers. Devising PIR schemes
with optimal download rate in the case of collusion and coded
data is still open in general. We provide a lifting operation
that can transform what we call one-shot PIR schemes for two
messages into schemes for any number of messages. We apply
this lifting operation on existing PIR schemes and describe two
immediate implications. First, we obtain novel PIR schemes with
improved download rate in the case of MDS coded data and
server collusion. Second, we provide a simplified description of
existing optimal PIR schemes on replicated data as lifted secret
sharing based PIR.
I. INTRODUCTION
We consider the problem of designing private information
retrieval (PIR) schemes on coded data stored on multiple
servers that can possibly collude. In this setting, a user wants
to download a message from a server with M messages
while revealing no information, in an information-theoretic
sense, about which message it is interested in. The database is
replicated on N servers, or in general, could be stored using
an erasure code, typically a Maximum Distance Separable
(MDS) code1. These servers could possibly collude to gain
information about the identity of the user’s retrieved message.
The PIR problem was first introduced and studied in [1], [2]
and was followed up by a large body of work (e.g. [3]–[8]).
The model there assumes the database to be replicated and
focuses on PIR schemes with efficient total communication
rate, i.e., upload and download. Motivated by big data applica-
tions and recent advances in the theory of codes for distributed
storage, there has been a growing interest in designing PIR
schemes that can query data that is stored in coded form and
not just replicated. For this setting, the assumption has been
that the messages being retrieved are very large (compared to
the queries) and therefore the focus has been on designing PIR
schemes that minimize the download rate. Despite significant
recent progress, the problem of characterizing the optimal PIR
download rate (called PIR capacity) in the case of coded data
and server collusion remains open in general.
Related work: When the data is replicated, the problem of
finding the PIR capacity, i.e., minimum download rate, is
essentially solved. It was shown in [4] and [5] that the PIR
capacity is (1+T/N+T 2/N2+· · ·+TM−1/NM−1)−1, where
N is the number of servers, T is the number of colluding
This work was supported in part by NSF Grant CCF 1817635.
1The assumption here is that messages are divided into chunks which are
encoded separately into n coded chunks using the same code.
servers and M is the number of messages. Capacity achieving
PIR schemes were also presented in [4] and [5].
When the data is coded and stored on a large number of
servers (exponential in the number of messages), it was shown
in [9] that downloading one extra bit is enough to achieve
privacy. In [10], the authors derived bounds on the tradeoff
between storage cost and download cost for linear coded data
and studied properties of PIR schemes on MDS data. Explicit
constructions of efficient PIR scheme on MDS data were
first presented in [11] for both collusions and no collusions.
Improved PIR schemes for MDS coded data with collusions
were presented in [12]. PIR schemes for general linear codes,
not necessarily MDS, were studied in [13]. The PIR capacity
for MDS coded data and no collusion was determined in [14],
and remains unknown for the case of collusions.
Contributions: We introduce what we refer to as a lifting op-
eration that transforms a class of one-shot linear PIR schemes
that can retrieve privately one out of a total of two messages,
into general PIR schemes on any number of messages.
In the literature, the majority of PIR schemes on coded
data, such as those in [11] and [12], are one-shot schemes.
First, we describe a refinement operation on these schemes that
improves their rate for two messages. Then, we describe how
the refined version can be lifted to any number of messages.
Finally, we apply the lifting operation on existing PIR schemes
and describe two immediate implications:
• Applying the lifting operation to the schemes presented
in [11] and [12], we obtain novel PIR schemes with
improved download rate for MDS coded data and server
collusion.
• The capacity achieving PIR schemes on replicated data
in [4] and [5] can be seen as lifted secret sharing.
II. SETTING
A set of M messages, {W 1,W 2, . . . ,WM} ⊆ FLq , are
stored on N servers each using an (N,K)-MDS code. We
denote by W ji ∈ FL/Kq , the data about W j stored on server i.
server 1 server 2 · · · server N
W 1 W 11 W
1
2 · · · W 1N
W 2 W 21 W
2
2 · · · W 2N
...
...
...
...
...
WM WM1 W
M
2 · · · WMN
Since the code is MDS, each W j is determined by any K-
subset of {W j1 , . . . ,W jN}.
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The data on server i is Di = (W 1i , . . . ,W
M
i ) ∈ FML/Kq .
A linear query (from now on we omit the term linear) is a
vector q ∈ FML/Kq . When a user sends a query q to a server i,
this server answers back with the inner product 〈Di, q〉 ∈ Fq .
The problem of private information retrieval can be stated
informally as follows: A user wishes to download a file Wm
without leaking any information about m to any of the servers
where at most T of them may collude. The goal is for the user
to achieve this while minimizing the download rate.
The messages W 1,W 2, . . . ,WM are assumed to be inde-
pendent and uniformly distributed elements of FLq . The user is
interested in a message Wm. The index of this message, m,
is chosen uniformly at random from the set {1, 2, . . . ,M}.
A PIR scheme is a set of queries for each possible desired
message Wm. We denote a scheme by Q = {Q1, . . . ,QM}
where Qm = {Qm1 , . . . , QmN} is the set of queries which
the user will send to each server when they wish to retrieve
Wm. So, if the user is interested in Wm, Qmi denotes
the set of queries sent to server i. The set of answers,
A = {A1, . . . ,AM}, is defined analogously.
A PIR scheme should satisfy two properties:
1) Correctness: H(Wm|Am) = 0.
2) T -Privacy: I(∪j∈JQmj ;m) = 0, for every J ⊆ [M ] such
that |J | = T , where [M ] = {1, . . . ,M}.
Correctness guarantees that the user will be able to retrieve
the message of interest. T -Privacy guarantees that no T
colluding servers will gain any information on the message
in which the user is interested.
Definition 1. Let M messages be stored using an (N,K)-
MDS code on N servers. An (N,K, T,M)-PIR scheme is a
scheme which satisfies correctness and T -Privacy.
Note that T -Privacy implies in |Q1| = |Qi| for every i, i.e.,
the number of queries does not depend on the desired message.
Definition 2. The PIR rate of an (N,K, T,M)-PIR scheme
Q is RQ = L|Q1| .
III. ONE-SHOT SCHEMES
In this section, we introduce the notion of a one-shot
scheme, which captures the majority of the schemes in the
literature.
Without loss of generality, we assume that the user is
interested in retrieving the first message. We denote by
V1 = {a ∈ FML/Kq : i > L/K ⇒ ai = 0},
the subspace of queries which only query the first message.
Definition 3. An (N,K, T,M)-one-shot PIR scheme of co-
dimension r is an (N,K, T,M)-PIR scheme where each
server is queried exactly once and in the following way.
Server 1 · · · Server r Server r + 1 · · · Server N
q1 · · · qr qr+1 + a1 · · · qN + aN−r
TABLE I: Query structure for a one-shot scheme.
The queries in Table I satisfy the following properties:
1) Any collection of T queries from q1, . . . , qN ∈ FML/Kq
is uniformly and independently distributed.
2) The a1, . . . ,aN−r ∈ V1 are such that the responses
〈Dr+1,a1〉, . . . , 〈DN ,aN−r〉 are linearly independent.
3) For i > r, the response 〈Di, qi〉 is a linear combination
of 〈D1, q1〉, . . . , 〈Dr, qr〉.
Property 1 ensures privacy. Properties 2 and 3 ensure
correctness.
Proposition 1. Let Q be an (N,K, T,M)-one-shot scheme
of co-dimension r. Then, its rate is given by
RQ =
N − r
N
= 1− r
N
.
Proof. Since for every i > r, 〈Di, qi〉 is a linear combination
of 〈D1, q1〉, . . . , 〈Dr, qr〉, the user can retrieve the linearly
independent 〈Dr+1,a1〉, . . . , 〈DN ,aN−r〉.
Technically, N − r must be divisible by L. When this does
not occur, the one-shot scheme must be repeated lcm(N−r, L)
times2. This, however, does not change the rate of the scheme.
We present an example of a one-shot scheme from [11].
Example 1. Suppose the messages are stored using a (4, 2)-
MDS code over F3 in the following way:
Server 1 Server 2 Server 3 Server 4
W 1 W 11 W
1
2 W
1
1 +W
1
2 W
1
1 + 2W
1
2
W 2 W 21 W
2
2 W
2
1 +W
2
2 W
2
1 + 2W
2
2
...
...
...
...
...
WM WM1 W
M
2 W
M
1 +W
M
2 W
M
1 + 2W
M
2
Suppose the user is interested in the first message and wants
2-privacy, i.e., at most 2 servers can collude. The following is
a (4, 2, 2,M)-one-shot scheme taken from [11].
Server 1 Server 2 Server 3 Server 4
Queries q1 q2 q3 q4 + e1
Responses 〈D1, q1〉 〈D2, q2〉 〈D3, q3〉 〈D4, q4〉
TABLE II: Query and response structure for Example 1.
The queries in Table II satisfy the following properties:
• The queries q1, q2 ∈ FML/Kq are uniformly and indepen-
dently distributed.
• We have q3 = q1 + q2 and q4 = q1 + 2q2.
• The query e1 ∈ V1 corresponds to the queries (in this
case there is only r = 1 query) a1, . . . ,aN−r in Table I,
and is the first vector of the standard basis of FML/Kq ,
i.e, e1 only has entry 1 in the first coordinate and 0 on
all the other coordinates.
This scheme is private since for any two servers the queries
are uniformly and independently distributed.
To retrieve 〈D4, e1〉 the user uses the following identity:
〈D4, q4〉 = −〈D1, q1〉+ 2〈D2, q2〉+ 2〈D3, q3〉. (1)
2We denote the least common multiple of N−r and K by lcm(N−r, L).
With this we have one linear combination of W 1, the first
coordinate of W 11 +W
1
2 . Repeating this lcm(N−r, L) times,
we obtain enough combinations to decode W 1.
To retrieve 1 unit of the message the user has to download
4 units. Therefore, the rate of the PIR scheme is R = 1/4,
which could have also been obtained from Proposition 1.
IV. THE REFINEMENT LEMMA
The rate of a one-shot scheme is independent of the number
of messages. In this section, we show how to refine a one-shot
scheme to obtain a better rate for the case of two messages.
Analogous to V1, we denote by
V2 = {b ∈ FML/Kq : i < L/K + 1 or i > 2L/K ⇒ bi = 0}
the subspace of queries which only query the second message.
Lemma 1 (The Refinement Lemma). Let Q be a one-shot
scheme of co-dimension r, with rate N−rN . Then, there exists an
(N,K, T, 2)-PIR scheme, Q′, with rate RQ′ = NN+r > N−rN .
Proof. We construct Q′ in the following way.
Server 1 · · · Server r Server r + 1 · · · Server N
a1 · · · ar ar+1 + br+1 · · · aN + bN
b1 · · · br
TABLE III: Query structure for Q′.
The queries in Table III satisfy the following properties:
• The queries ai ∈ V1 and bi ∈ V2.
• Each query bi is chosen with distribution induced by the
query qi of the one-shot scheme Q.3
• Any subset of size T of 〈D1, b1〉, . . . , 〈DN , bN 〉 is
linearly independent4.
• For i ≤ r, ai is chosen with distribution identical to bi.
• For i > r, ai is chosen such that the set of responses
〈D1,a1〉, . . . , 〈DN ,aN 〉 is linearly independent4.
Privacy is inherited from the one-shot scheme by random-
izing the order in which the queries to a server are sent.
The following is also inherited from the one-shot
scheme: For i > r, 〈Di, bi〉 is a linear combination of
〈D1, b1〉, . . . , 〈Dr, br〉. Thus, the user can retrieve the linearly
independent 〈D1,a1〉, . . . , 〈DN ,aN 〉.
We now apply the refinement lemma to Example 1.
Example 2. Consider Example 1 but with two messages.
Applying the refinement lemma, we get the following scheme.
Server 1 Server 2 Server 3 Server 4
a1 a2 a3 a4 + b4
b1 b2 b3
TABLE IV: Query structure of the refinement of Table II.
The queries in Table IV satisfy the following properties:
• The queries ai ∈ V1 and bi ∈ V2.
3A probability distribution on FML/Kq induces a probability distribution
on V2 ⊆ FML/Kq .
4For large fields this occurs with high probability.
• The queries b1 and b2 are uniformly and independently
distributed and are linearly independent.
• We have b3 = b1 + b2 and b4 = b1 + 2b2.
• The queries a1 and a2 are uniformly and independently
distributed and are linearly independent.
• We have a3 = a1 + a2 and a4 = a1 + 3a2.
Privacy is inherited from the one-shot scheme.
To retrieve 〈D4,a4〉 we use the following identity (inherited
from (1) in the one-shot scheme):
〈D4, b4〉 = −〈D1, b1〉+ 2〈D2, b2〉+ 2〈D3, b3〉.
The choice a4 = a1 + 3a2 is done so that the set of
responses 〈D1,a1〉, . . . , 〈D4,a4〉 is linearly independent.
As per Lemma 1, the rate of this scheme is R = 4/7, larger
than the rate of 1/4 in Example 1.
Remark 1. The scheme in Example 1 is defined over the field
F3. However, the refinement of this scheme in Example 2
requires a larger field since we need the coefficient 3 in
a4 = a1 + 3a2 so that the set {〈D1,a1〉, . . . , 〈D4,a4〉} is
linearly independent. In our schemes, we will assume that the
base field is large enough.
V. THE LIFTING THEOREM
In this section, we present our main result in Theorem 1.
We show how to extend, by means of a lifting operation, the
refined scheme on two messages to any number of messages.
Informally, the lifting operation consists of two steps: a
symmetrization step, and a way of dealing with “leftover”
queries that result from the symmetrization. We also introduce
a symbolic matrix representation for PIR schemes which
simplifies our analysis.
A. An Example of the Lifting Operation
We denote by
Vj = {b ∈ FML/Kq : i < (j − 1)L/K + 1 or i > jL/K ⇒ bi = 0},
the subspace of queries which only query the j-th message.
Definition 4. A k-query is a sum of k queries, each belonging
to a different Vj , j ∈ [M ].
So, for example, if a ∈ V1, b ∈ V2, and c ∈ V3, then a is
a 1-query, a+ b is a 2-query, and a+ b+ c is a 3-query.
Consider the scheme in Example 2. We represent the
structure of this scheme by means of the following matrix:
S2 =
(
1 1 1 2
)
. (2)
Each column of S2 corresponds to a server. A 1 in column i
represents sending all possible combinations of 1-queries of
every message to server i, and a 2 represents sending all
combinations of 2-queries of every message to server i. We
call this matrix the symbolic matrix of the scheme.
The co-dimension r = 3 tells us that for every r = 3 ones
there is N − r = 1 twos in the symbolic matrix.
Given the interpretation above, the symbolic matrix S2 can
be readily applied to obtain the structure of a PIR scheme for
any number of messages M . For M = 3, the structure is as
follows.
server 1 server 2 server 3 server 4
a1 a2 a3 a4 + b4
b1 b2 b3 a5 + c4
c1 c2 c3 b5 + c5
TABLE V: Query structure for M = 3 in Example 1 as
implied by the symbolic matrix in (2).
The relationships between the queries in Table V is taken
from the one-shot scheme and satisfy the following properties:
• The ai ∈ V1, bi ∈ V2, and ci ∈ V3.
• The a’s and b’s are chosen as in Example 2.
• The c’s are chosen analogously to the b’s.
• The extra “leftover” term b5 + c5 is chosen uniformly
and independent and different from zero.
The scheme in Table V has rate 5/12. In this scheme, the
role of b5 + c5 is to achieve privacy and does not contribute
to the decoding process. In this sense, it can be seen as
a “leftover” query of the symmetrization. By repeating the
scheme r = 3 times, each one shifted to the left, so that the
“leftover” queries appear in different servers, we can apply the
same idea in the one-shot scheme to the “leftover” queries, as
shown in Table VI. Thus, we improve the rate from 5/12 to
16/37.
server 1 server 2 server 3 server 4
a1 a2 a3 a4 + b4
b1 b2 b3 a5 + c4
c1 c2 c3 b5 + c5
a7 a8 a9 + b9 a6
b7 b8 a10 + c9 b6
c7 c8 b10 + c10 c6
a13 a14 + b14 a11 a12
b13 a15 + c14 b11 b12
c13 b15 + c15 c11 c12
a16 + b16 + c16
TABLE VI: Query structure for the lifted scheme.
The queries in Table VI satisfy the following properties:
• The scheme is separated into four rounds.
• In each of the first three rounds the queries behave as
in Table V, but shifted to the left so that the “leftover”
queries appear in different servers.
• But now, b16 + c16, b15 + c15, b10 + c10, and b5 + c5
are chosen analogously to the one-shot scheme.
More precisely, b16 + c16 and b15 + c15 are uniformly and
independently distributed and are linearly independent,
b10 + c10 = (b16 + c16) + (b15 + c15)
and
b5 + c5 = (b16 + c16) + 2(b15 + c15).
In this way, 〈D1,a16〉 can be retrieved using the following
identity (analogous to Example 2):
〈D1, b16 + c16〉 = 2〈D2, b15 + c15〉+ 2〈D3, b10 + c10〉
− 〈D1, b5 + c5〉
This scheme can be represented by the following matrix5.
S3 =

1 1 1 2
1 1 2 1
1 2 1 1
3

The scheme for M = 3 messages was constructed re-
cursively using the one for 2 messages. It is this recursive
operation that we call lifting. The main idea behind the lifting
operation is that r = 3 entries with value k generate N−r = 1
entry with value k + 1 in the symbolic matrix.
Lifting S3 to S4 follows the same procedure: repeat S3
r = 3 times, each one shifted to the left, to produce N−r = 1
4-query. As a result, we obtain the following symbolic matrix.
S4 =

1 1 1 2
1 1 2 1
1 2 1 1
3
1 1 2 1
1 2 1 1
2 1 1 1
3
1 2 1 1
2 1 1 1
1 1 1 2
3
4

The queries are to be chosen analogously to the previous
examples which we describe rigorously in the next subsection.
B. The Symbolic Matrix and the Lifting Operation
Definition 5. Let Q be a one-shot scheme with co-dimension
r. A symbolic matrix SM for Q is defined recursively as
follows.
S2 = (
r︷ ︸︸ ︷
1, . . . , 1,
N−r︷ ︸︸ ︷
2, . . . , 2) (3)
SM+1 = lift(SM ) (4)
The lifting operation is defined as,
lift(SM ) =

SM
σ(SM )
...
σr−1(SM )
A
 ,
where σ(SM ) shifts the columns of SM to the left and A is
a matrix which we will describe later in detail.
Formally, σ(SM )(i, j) = SM (i, j + 1) for 1 ≤ j ≤ n − 1
and σ(SM )(i, n) = SM (i, 1). Here, σ(SM )(i, j) is the entry
in the i-row and j-th column of the matrix σ(SM ).
The matrix A is constructed as follows: We first define an
ordering6, ≺, on (i, j) ∈ N2 by (i, j) ≺ (i′, j′) if either i < i′
or i = i′ and j < j′.
5We omit zeros in our symbolic matrices.
6This is known in the literature as a lexicographical order.
Let B = {(i, j) : SM (i, j) = M} = {b1, . . . , b#(M,SM )}
such that i < j implies in bi ≺ bj , where
#(k,A) = |{(i, j) ∈ [n]× [m] : Aij = k}|.
Define
τ(i, j) =
{
(i+ rows(SM ), j − 1) if j > 1,
(i+ rows(SM ), N) if j = 1,
where rows(SM ) is the number of rows in SM .
Define the auxiliary sets Bi = {bi, τ(bi), . . . , τ r−1(bi)} and
c(Bi) = {j : (i, j) ∈ Bi).
Then, A is defined as
Ai,j =
{
0 if j ∈ c(Bi),
M + 1 if j /∈ c(Bi).
As an example, we show how S4 in Section V-A is
constructed in terms of S3. In this case, r = 3 and the matrix
A consists of a single row.
S4 =
1 1 1 2
1 1 2 1
1 2 1 1
3
1 1 2 1
1 2 1 1
2 1 1 1
3
1 2 1 1
2 1 1 1
1 1 1 2
3
4


S3
σ(S3)
σ2(S3)
A
Translation from symbolic matrix to PIR scheme. Each
entry k of a symbolic matrix SM represents
(
M
k
)
k-queries,
one for every combination of k messages. The queries are
taken analogously to the queries in the one-shot scheme.
This is done by making the r queries represented by
Bi = {bi, τ(bi), . . . , τ r−1(bi)} to generate the N − r queries
represented by {(i, j) : Ai,j =M + 1}.
To find the rate of the lifted scheme we need to count the
number of entries in the symbolic matrix of a specific value.
Proposition 2. Let SM be the symbolic matrix of a one-shot
scheme with co-dimension r. Then,
#(k, SM ) =
(
N − r
r
)k−1
rM−1 1 ≤ k ≤M
Proof. It follows from the lifting operation that
#(k, SM ) =
N − r
r
#(k − 1, SM )
=
(
N − r
r
)k−1
#(1, SM )
=
(
N − r
r
)k−1
rM−1.
Theorem 1. Let Q be a one-shot scheme of co-dimension
r. Then, refining and lifting Q gives an (N,K, T,M)-PIR
scheme Q′ with rate
RQ′ =
(N − r)NM−1
NM − rM =
N − r
N
(
1− ( rN )M) .
Proof. Given the one shot-scheme Q, we apply the refinement
lemma to obtain a scheme with symbolic matrix S2 as in (3).
The scheme Q′ is defined as the one with symbolic matrix
SM = lift
M−2(S2) as in (4).7 Privacy and correctness of the
scheme follow directly from the privacy and correctness of the
one-shot scheme.
Next, we calculate the rate RQ′ = L|Q′1| . Each entry k of
SM corresponds to
(
M
k
)
k-queries, one for each combination
of k messages. Thus, using Proposition 2,
|Q′1| =
M∑
k=1
#(k, SM )
(
M
k
)
= rM−1
M∑
k=1
(
N − r
r
)k−1(
M
k
)
=
NM − rM
N − r
To find L we need to count the queries which query W1.
The number of k-queries which query W1 is
(
M−1
k−1
)
. Thus,
L =
M∑
k=1
#(k, SM )
(
M − 1
k − 1
)
= rM−1
M∑
k=1
(
N − r
r
)k−1(
M − 1
k − 1
)
= NM−1
Therefore, RQ′ =
(N−r)NM−1
NM−rM .
VI. REFINING AND LIFTING KNOWN SCHEMES
In this section, we refine and lift known one-shot schemes
from the literature.
We first refine and lift the scheme described in Theorem 3
of [15]. In our notation, this scheme is a one-shot scheme with
co-dimension r = NK−N+TK .
Theorem 2. Refining and lifting the scheme presented in
Theorem 3 of [15] gives an (N,K, T,M)-PIR scheme Q with
RQ =
(N + T ).(NK)M−1
(NK)M − (NK −N + T )M . (5)
Next, we refine and lift the scheme in [12]. In our notation,
this scheme has co-dimension r = K + T − 1. Thus, we
7The power in the expression liftM−2(S2) denotes functional composition.
obtain the first PIR scheme to achieve the rate conjectured to
be optimal8 in [12] for MDS coded data with collusions.
Theorem 3. Refining and lifting the scheme presented in [12]
gives an (N,K, T,M)-PIR scheme, Q, with
RQ =
(N −K − T + 1)NM−1
NM − (K + T − 1)M =
1− K+T−1N
1− (K+T−1N )M . (6)
The rate of the scheme in Theorem 2 (5) is upper bounded
by the rate of the scheme in Theorem 3 (6), with equality
when either K = 1 or N = K + T .
Now, we consider the case of replicated data (K = 1)
on N servers with at most T collusions. A T -threshold
linear secret sharing scheme [17] can be transformed into the
following one-shot PIR scheme.
Server 1 . . . Server T Server T + 1 . . . Server N
q1 qT qT+1 + a1 qN + aN−T
Theorem 4. Refining and lifting a T -threshold linear secret
sharing scheme gives an (N, 1, T,M)-PIR scheme Q with
capacity-achieving rate
RQ =
(N − T )NM−1
NM − TM .
This scheme has the same capacity achieving rate as the
scheme presented in [5] but with less queries.
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